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Is the Appearance of Impropriety an Appropriate
Standard for Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First
Century?
Nancy J. Moore*

I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2007, the American Bar Association ("ABA") revised its
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, including significant changes in both
form and substance. 1 The adoption of the 2007 Judicial Code
concluded a three-and-a-half year revision process by the ABA Joint
Commission to Evaluate the Model Judicial Code ("Commission").2
During the revision process, the Commission solicited comment on a
number of provisions that had provoked extensive discussion and
controversy in Commission hearings and meetings, including a
provision in the 1990 Judicial Code that admonished judges to avoid not
3
only impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety.
The majority of commentators supported retaining the admonition to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety, including enforcing this

* Professor of Law and Nancy Parton Scholar, Boston University School of Law. My thanks
to the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for organizing the conference on "The Judiciary in
the 21st Century," for which this Article was written.
1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007). For a comprehensive discussion of the
changes in form and substance, see generally CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES,
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, REPORTERS' NOTES TO THE MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009) (discussing Canons 1-4).
2. Statement of Mark I. Harrison, Chair, ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ChairMessage.pdf.
3. See Memorandum from Mark I. Harrison, Chair, ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct to Individuals and Entities Interested in Judicial Ethics 1-3
(May 11, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/memo-canon 1_051104.pdf
(discussing the particularly pertinent revisions by the Joint Commission). For a discussion of the
treatment of the appearance of impropriety standard in the 1990 Code, see, e.g., Leslie W.
Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 952-57 (1996);
Ronald D. Rotunda, JudicialEthics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the ProposedNew ABA
Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1353-54 (2006).
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admonition through judicial discipline. 4 Nevertheless, the Commission
went back and forth on the question. First, the Commission sided with5

those who urged it to retain the appearance of impropriety standard;
6

then it changed course, siding with those who urged its elimination.
In February 2007, the Commission issued its Report to the ABA
House of Delegates. In that report, the Commission recommended
retaining the admonition to judges to avoid the appearance of
impropriety, but only in the language of Canon 1 itself, not in one of the
several black-letter rules under Canon 1.7 In addition, the Commission
drafted commentary clarifying that judges could not be disciplined
under the Canons alone; rather, only the rules themselves were subject
8

to enforcement.
Then on February 7, 2007-just days before the ABA House of
Delegates was to meet and vote on the Commission's Final Report-the
Conference of Chief Justices of the states' highest courts weighed in on
the appearance of impropriety question. It did so in the strongest

possible terms, adopting a resolution opposing the Commission's Final
Report due to its failure to provide for enforcement of the prohibition on

4. ABA JOINT COMM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, REPORT TO
2006),
available at
4
(Dec.
20,
OF
DELEGATES
ABA
HOUSE
THE
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/house-report.html [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
5. See, e.g., ABA JOINT COMM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
PRELIMINARY REPORT Canon 1 & R. 1.03 (June 30, 2005), availableat http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/Canonl.pdf (indicating judicial obligation to comply with the appearance of
impropriety standard); ABA JOINT COMM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon I (May 2004 Draft), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
draft canon%201_051204_cleanlb.pdf (including the appearance-of-impropriety standard only in
Canon 1 itself and not as an enforceable rule).
6. See ABA JOINT COM'N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
available
at
7
(2007),
CHANGES
OF
REPORTERS'
EXPLANATION
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/mcjc-2007.pdf [hereinafter REPORTERS' EXPLANATION]:
To address the concern that a duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety was too
vague to be independently enforceable, the Commission's preliminary draft included a
comment to the effect that ordinarily, when judges are disciplined for violating their
duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety, it is in combination with other, more
specific rule violations that give rise to the appearance problem. When the preliminary
draft was circulated for public comment in June 2005, that comment was criticized
widely for, among other things, diluting the "appearance of impropriety" standard
unnecessarily.
The comment referenced in the Reporters' Explanation appears in the June 2004 Draft. See
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.01 cmt. 2 (June 2004 Draft) (on file with the author).
7. ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 30.
8. Id. Scope 2 ("For a judge to be disciplined for violating a Canon, violation of a Rule must
be established.").
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creating the appearance of impropriety. 9 In addition, the Conference of
Chief Justices intimated that if the Commission failed to amend its
proposed code, as the Conference suggested, then the chief justices
making it
would not lend their support for the new code, thereby
10
unlikely that it would be adopted in more than a few states.
Not surprisingly, the Commission backed down and revised its
report. As a result, the ABA House of Delegates quickly approved the
newly revised report." Currently, just two years later, nine state courts
have already adopted the 2007 Code, an additional seven state courts
are reviewing reports in which adoption of the Code has been
recommended, and another twenty-two jurisdictions have committees
12
reviewing the Code.
In its present form, Canon 1 states: "A Judge Shall Uphold and
Promote the Independence, Integrity, and the Impartiality of the
Judiciary, and Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety."' 13 In addition, Rule 1.2, entitled "Promoting Confidence
in the Judiciary," states that "[a] judge shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
and shall avoid impropriety and the
impartiality of the judiciary,
4
appearance of impropriety."'
All of the state courts in which the 2007 Judicial Code has either
been adopted or recommended appear to have retained the appearance
of impropriety as an enforceable standard, in accordance with the view
9. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 3: Opposing the Report of the ABA Joint
Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in Light of its Failureto Providefor
Enforceability of the Canon on "Appearance of Impropriety (Feb. 7, 2007), available at
http://ccj.ncsc.dni .us/JudicialConductResolutions/resol3AppearanceOflmpropriety.html.
10. Id. The Conference stated:
FURTHER, BE IT RESOLVED that without speaking to the merits of any of the other
revisions proposed by the Joint Commission, the Conference of Chief Justices
respectfully encourages the House of Delegates to amend the proposed revised Code as
described above, and if so amended, to act expeditiously in its consideration of the
Joint Commission's Report and Recommendations, at which time the Conference can
commend to its members the revisions as a foundation upon which states can build to
improve and clarify the standards of conduct for the judiciary.
Id.
11. See supra note I and accompanying text. The revised Model Code was adopted on
February 12, 2007, just five days after the CCJ resolution was passed. See MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007), available at www.abanet.org/judicialethics/approvedMCJC.html
(discussing implementation of the revised Model Code).
12. See Center for Professional Responsibility, State Adoption of Revised Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/map.html (last visited November 13, 2009)
(showing state by state stage of adoption of the revised Model Code).
13. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2008).
14. Id. R. 1.2.
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of the Conference of Chief Justices. 15 Thus, in one sense, it seems that
the debate is over, and the proponents of the appearance of impropriety
standard have prevailed.
Nevertheless, the opponents of the appearance of impropriety
standard have raised a number of important objections, and in my view,
the supporters have not yet fully explained why the appearance of
impropriety standard should be retained in a judicial disciplinary code

for the twenty-first century. My purpose in this Article is to explain
why I believe that the criticisms leveled against the appearance of
16
impropriety standard for judges are unwarranted.
II.

APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD TO JUDGES BUT NOT LAWYERS

One of the arguments commonly made by critics is that if the
standard is a good one, it would be applied to both lawyers and judges,

but the ABA expressly rejected applying the appearance of impropriety
standard to lawyers as long ago as 1983, when it first adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 17 However, as set forth below, the
appearance of impropriety was never used as a separate standard for
lawyer discipline, 18 and, more importantly, there are good reasons to
apply the appearance of impropriety standard to judges and not to
lawyers, although these reasons have not yet been adequately
articulated. 19

15. See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY POL'Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., COMPARISON OF
ABA MODEL JUDICIAL CODE AND STATE VARIATIONS 1 (Aug. 25, 2009), available at
http://abanet.org/cpr/code/l_2.pdf (identifying the "appearance of impropriety" standard and state
amendments in accordance with view of the Conference). Delaware replaced "shall" with
"should," id. at 2, but it did so with respect to all of the black-letter rules, which are clearly
intended to provide a basis for judicial discipline. See DEL. JUDGES' CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT pmbl. 7 (2008), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Rules/?DJCJC_ 101608a.pdf.
16. As a member of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility's Policy Implementation
Committee (formerly the Joint Committee on Lawyer Regulation), I had been asked during the
revision process to comment on the Commission's various drafts. I did not consider myself an
expert on the Judicial Code, so I had few comments to make. I did, however, indicate that I
supported continuing the use of the appearance of impropriety standard as a basis for judicial
discipline, although I did not then state my reasons for doing so. See Memorandum from Nancy
J. Moore to JCLR Subcommittee on ABA Code of Judicial Conduct (Jan. 30, 2006), availableat
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/comm-rules-moore 013006_bw.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 3, at 1344-51 (discussing the "appearance of impropriety"
standard under the ABA's model code for lawyers); Letter from Ronald C. Minkoff & Ronald E.
Mallen, Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers ("APRL") to ABA Commission on
the Model
Code of Judicial
Conduct
7-9 (June
30, 2004),
available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/commrules minkoff_063004.pdf
[hereinafter
APRL Letter] (highlighting APRL's comments on the canon of the model code).
18. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
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Prior to the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
1983, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility did not expressly
prohibit representation adverse to a former client. 20 As a result, when
the issue began surfacing in disqualification cases, courts seized on the
language of Canon 9 of the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, captioned "Avoiding Even the Appearance of
Professional Impropriety," 2 1 and interpreted it as providing a basis for
disqualification when the lawyer represented a new client in the same or
a substantially related matter adverse to a former client.2 2 Although it
was fairly clear that the ABA never intended the appearance of
impropriety language in Canon 9 to create a stand-alone basis for
lawyer discipline, 2 3 courts deciding a disqualification motion are not
24
bound by rules adopted for purposes of disciplinary proceedings.
Thus, the appearance of impropriety standard began to take on a life of
its own in the context of lawyer disqualification. 25 Indeed, although the
term "appearance of impropriety" disappeared altogether in the 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 there are some courts that
continue to disqualify a lawyer in pending litigation because of an

20. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 362-64 (1986) (discussing the
1908 and 1969 ABA Canons of Ethics and Code). The 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics prohibited
"the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting
any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed," but the 1969 Code
"inexplicably omitted any specific mention of the former-client conflict problem." Id. at 363.
21. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969).
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 reporters'
note to cmt. b (2000) (noting "substantial body of case law" that relied on the duty "to avoid the
appearance of impropriety," despite the lack of a specific rule in the 1969 Model Code); 1
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 13.3 (3d ed. Supp. 2005))
(discussing rules governing former client conflicts of interest).
23. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1983) (stating that
Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms," Ethical Considerations are "aspirational in
character" and that only Disciplinary Rules are "mandatory in character"); see also, e.g., Rotunda,
supra note 3, at 1344-46 ("The ABA briefly flirted with the 'appearances of impropriety'
standard for lawyers but never adopted it as an enforceable rule.").
24. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 77-78 (1996) ("The Judiciary's Role in Establishing Conflict Standards").
25. See generally Victor H. Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study
of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243, 244-47 (1980)
(discussing the "federal judiciary's interpretation of Canon 9 in the ten years since its adoption by
the [ABA]"); James Lindgren, Toward a New Standardof Attorney Disqualification,1982 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 419, 424-40 (1982) (discussing "widespread belief' that the Model Code should
provide the guide for deciding disqualification motions); cf WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 32-1
(1986) ("The appearance-of-impropriety rubric is invoked much more commonly in cases dealing
with the disqualification of lawyers . . . and less often in cases dealing with discipline of
lawyers.").
26. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 3, at 1349.
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appearance of impropriety. 27 As in the past, however, disqualification
for an appearance of impropriety almost always occurs in the specific
context of an allegation that a lawyer was involved in a conflict of
28
interest.
Of course, one can still ask the question whether, if avoiding the
appearance of impropriety is a good standard for judges, would it not
also be a good standard for lawyers? If so, why has the ABA not
proposed that lawyers be disciplined for avoiding the appearance of
impropriety? Commentators and courts have attempted to explain why
the appearance of impropriety standard is relevant for judges but not
lawyers; however, in my view, their explanations are unsatisfactory. As
Professor Ronald Rotunda has noted:
[t]he rationales [for distinguishing judges and lawyers] are apt to be
vague, such as: people expect more from judges and appearances are
important, or judges are the 'symbol of government under the rule of
law' or judges have different roles
than lawyers .... [but a]ll those
29
arguments tend to be conclusory.
In addition, "even if accepted at face value ...they do not explain
why these different rules must be [so] vague." 30 Here I propose what I
believe is a better and more detailed explanation of, first, why judges
are different from lawyers with respect to the appearance of impropriety
standard and, second, why the appearance of impropriety standard is
necessarily general and cannot intelligibly be made more specific.
As neutral decision-makers, judges have a single, clearly articulated
duty to conduct themselves with independence, integrity, and
impartiality. 3 1 As a result, under the 2007 Judicial Code, actual
"impropriety" means judicial conduct that in fact compromises the

27. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. County Court of City & County of Denver, 37 P.3d
453, 456 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding disqualification based on appearance of impropriety does
not require impropriety in fact); State ex rel. Cosenza v. Hill, 607 S.E.2d 811, 817-18 (W. Va.
2004) (finding potential exposure to conversations pertaining to one party created appearance of
impropriety that precluded attorney's representation of another party); see also Ark. Valley State
Bank v. Phillips, 171 P.3d 899, 908-09 (Okla. 2007) (discussing trend to abandon appearance of
impropriety standard in disqualification cases and collecting authorities reflecting both the
standard's rejection and continued use, and ultimately rejecting the standard).
28. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 319-23 (discussing the "appearance of
impropriety" standard and underscoring typical outcome of sanctions based on actual
impropriety).
29. Rotunda, supra note 3, at 1350-51.
30. Id. at 1351.
31. See REPORTERS' EXPLANATION, supra note 6, at 7 ("In the Commission's view,
independence, integrity, and impartiality are overarching, fundamental values that the Rules
promote ....
").
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independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge. 32 And thus the
"appearance of impropriety" denotes judicial conduct that reasonably
appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary. 33 Avoiding not only impropriety, but also the appearance
of impropriety, is important for judges because public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary is critical to
the public's willingness to accept judicial decision-making and submit
34
to the rule of law.
Consider an example from a reported case. A Louisiana judge
appeared in blackface make-up and an orange prison jumpsuit and
handcuffs at a Halloween party held at a restaurant. 35 The judge's
conduct was observed not only by party guests, but also by the staff of
the restaurant, including black employees, and by customers who came
in for take-out food. 36 One of the customers reported the incident to the
37
local paper.
Canon 3 of the 1990 Judicial Code prohibited a judge from
38
manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of his judicial duties,
but of course the judge in Ellender was in a social, not professional,
setting. In addition, there was no evidence that the judge's decisions
were influenced by race. In fact there was evidence that there was no
disparity in his sentencing based on race, and several AfricanAmericans testified that they believed that the judge was fair in his
decisions and treatment of the litigants. 39 Nevertheless, the judge's
32. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology 5-7 (2008) ("Impropriety includes
conduct that violates the law, court rules, or provisions of this Code, and conduct that undermines
a judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality."); see also id. R. 1.2, R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (Rule 1.2 is
designed to avoid conduct that either "compromises or appears to compromise the independence,
integrity and impartiality of a judge").
33. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt 3 (2007); see also id. R. 1.2 cmt. 5 ("The
test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a
perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on
the judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.").
34. See, e.g., id. R. 1.2 cmt. 3 ("Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the
judiciary.").
35. In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 227 (La. 2004).
36. Id.
37. Id. As a result, the local newspaper published an article entitled "Local Judge's
Masquerade Sparks Racial Concerns." Id. The story was further publicized by local broadcast
media, CNN, and two New Orleans television stations. Id. at 227-28. Six complaints were filed
with the state Judiciary Commission. Id. at 228.
38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990). See also MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2008) ("A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties,
by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice ... .
39. Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 232.
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conduct clearly created the appearance that he was prejudiced against
blacks and would not be impartial when they appeared before him as
parties. 40 As a result, it was inevitable that blacks would have less
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.
There is, however, no analogous concern with the conduct of
lawyers. Lawyers have no similar single, clearly articulated duty.
Indeed, lawyers owe very different duties to clients, prospective clients,
courts, third persons who might be affected by a client's conduct, and
the public at large. 4 1 Moreover, the duties that lawyers owe to different

constituents of the legal system are often in conflict, and it usually takes
a specific conduct rule to determine which duty trumps another in
particular situations. 42 Lawyer ethics codes have, therefore, never had a
general rule that prohibits lawyers from committing an "impropriety,"
nor do they-or could they-have a general rule that prohibits lawyers
43
from creating the mere "appearance" of impropriety.

40. Id. at 229.
41. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2008) ("A lawyer, as a member of
the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."). The lawyer's duties to clients
and prospective clients are set forth primarily in Parts 1 and 2 of the Model Rules. The lawyer's
duties to courts and opposing parties are set forth in Part 3, and the lawyer's duties to persons
other than courts are set forth in Part 4. The lawyer's duties to the public at large are set forth in
Parts 5-8.
42. See id. pmbl. 9:
In the nature of law practice... conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually
all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical
person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct often
prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts.
A good example of a specific conduct rule that resolves potentially conflicting responsibilities is
the rule requiring lawyers to prevent or rectify false testimony, thereby determining that the
lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal trumps the lawyer's duty of confidentiality to a client. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), (b) (2009) (discussing the rules governing a
lawyer's "candor toward the tribunal").
43. It would be possible, of course, to adopt a rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in
conduct that "appears" to be in violation of a more specific disciplinary rule, for example,
conduct that "appears" to create a conflict of interest, even though there is no actual conflict
under Rule 1.7 or 1.8. The problem here is that such an undue broadening of the conflict of
interest rules-which are already broadly drafted to cover not only actual but also potential
conflicts-would interfere not only with the lawyer's interest in making a living, but also, and
more importantly, with both a client's interest in retaining a particular lawyer and respect for
client autonomy.
See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous
Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and
Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 227-28 (1982) (noting criticism of the appearance of
impropriety standard in determining when a conflict of interest between current clients is
consentable, because "there is an increasing recognition that emphasis on the importance of
protecting lawyers' reputations unduly interferes with legitimate interests of clients.").
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III. THE NEED FOR GENERAL "CATCH-ALL" PROVISIONS IN BOTH
JUDICIAL AND LAWYER CODES

What lawyer codes do have, however, are other general provisions
that serve as "catch-all" rules for situations not addressed by the more
specific rules. For example, Rule 8.4(d) prohibits lawyers from
engaging in conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice." 44 In
addition, a number of states continue to use a provision of the former
ABA Model Code 4 5 that subjects lawyers to discipline for any conduct
that "adversely reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice law." 4 6 As a
result, although it may be true that lawyer codes no longer contain
references to the appearance of impropriety, they do contain equally
general provisions that are subject to much the same criticisms leveled
against the appearance of impropriety standard in the 2007 Model
Judicial Code, namely, that they are impermissibly vague and thereby
47
both unpredictable and unfair.

The charge of vagueness that is leveled against both the judicial
appearance of impropriety standard and the more general lawyer
conduct rules includes both constitutional and policy objections. The
constitutional objections are, I believe, rather easily dismissed.
Although a few courts have expressed concerns, 48 the clear majority of
courts that have addressed these types of general provisions have upheld

44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1-102(A)(6) (1983).
46. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2009); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2007); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (2008); N.Y. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (2009); OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (2009); VT.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h); see also COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h)
(2008) (lawyer shall not "engage in any conduct that directly, intentionally, and wrongfully harms
others and that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law"); United States v. Hearst,
638 F.2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1980) ("conduct unbecoming a member of the bar"); Matter of
Beaver, 510 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Wis. 1994) ("offensive personality").
47. See In re Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093,1099 (Mass. 1996) (noting that
absent a limiting principle, Rule 8.4(d) "presents the risk of vagueness and arbitrary application")
(citing 2 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 8.4:501, at 957 (2d ed. Supp.
1994)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. c (2000) ("[T]he
breadth of such provisions creates the risk that a charge using only such language would fail to
...); Bruce A. Green,
give fair warning of the nature of the charges to a lawyer respondent.
Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69
N.C. L. REV. 687, 695-96 (1991) (positing some provisions "provide no clear guidance to
lawyers" and serve as "catch-all[s]" to which courts "occasionally resort when they want to
punish an advocate's conduct that is not specifically proscribed by the ethical rules").
48. See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 91
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (federal abstention)
(holding the appearance of impropriety standard in the New York Judicial Code unconstitutional
and void for vagueness); see also authorities cited supra note 47.
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them against due process challenges for vagueness. 49 Admittedly, there
are only a few decisions that directly address the constitutionality of the
appearance of impropriety standard for judges. 50 However, there are a
number of decisions that address similarly general provisions of the
judicial code, such as the rule requiring conduct "that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 5 1 There
are also numerous decisions upholding the constitutionality of various
general provisions of the lawyer codes, for example, the prohibition
against "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" 52 and
"conduct that [adversely] reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice
53
law."
In these decisions, courts recognize that the purpose of professional
discipline is not to punish criminals, but rather to protect the public by
maintaining standards of professional fitness. 54 As a result, what are

49. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 67, 86 & n.48 (1986) ("[M]ost
attacks upon Code provisions charging that they are void for vagueness in violation of the due
process clause have been unavailing."); see also, e.g., People v. Morely, 725 P.2d 510, 516 (Colo.
1986); Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Rozbicki, 595 A.2d 819, 825 (Conn. 1991); In re Crossen,
880 N.E.2d 352, 379 (Mass. 2008); In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, 564-65 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998); In
re lluzzi, 632 A.2d 346, 349-50 (Vt. 1993); Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of
Impropriety: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV.
63, 94 n.194 (2005) (citing additional cases).
50. See, e.g., Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 91; In re Sims, 462 N.E.2d 370, 375 (N.Y. 1984); In
re Conduct of Roth, 645 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Or. 1982).
51. See, e.g., In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d at 565 (citing cases).
52. See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 943 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 1988); Rogers v. Miss.
Bar, 731 So. 2d 1158, 1164 (Miss. 1999); In re Gadbois, 786 A.2d 393, 399-400 (Vt. 2001); see
also, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Goldsborough, 624 A.2d 503 (Md. 1993).
53. See, e.g., In re Illuzzi, 632 A.2d 346, 349-50 (Vt. 1993).
54. See, e.g., In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 775 (Ariz. 2004) ("This court has long held that the
objective of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, the profession and the
administration of justice and not to punish the offender."); In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 231 (D.C.
1986) ("In all cases, our purpose in imposing discipline is to serve the public and professional
interests we have identified, rather than to visit punishment upon an attorney."); Roederick C.
White, Sr., The Matrix Phenomenon: The Belief that the Lawyer DisciplinarySystem is Designed
to Give Lawyers Another Chance. Revisiting Penological Theory, 32 S.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004)
("The primary objective of discipline is to protect the judicial system and the public. As such,
punishment of the lawyer is not the primary objective."). In In re Ruffalo, the United States
Supreme Court, in requiring lawyer disciplinary proceedings to protect certain procedural due
process concerns, characterized the sanction of disbarment as "a punishment or penalty imposed
on the lawyer," but further noted that the sanction is "designed to protect the public." In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968). Thus, Ruffalo has come to stand for the proposition that
"[t]he criminal system is geared towards punishing the individual lawyer, but legal ethical rules
and sanctions have different goals: to protect the profession and to protect the general public."
Brian Finkelstein, Should PermanentDisbarmentbe Permanent?,20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 587,
593 (2007).
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seen as necessarily general provisions 5 5 are upheld both because they
are viewed as regulation, not punishment, 56 and because they apply not
to laypersons but rather to professionals, "who [are said to] have the
benefit of guidance provided by case law, court rules, and the 'lore of
57
the profession."
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IS AN APPROPRIATE
STANDARD FOR JUDGES

Setting aside constitutional questions, what about the policy
objections to the appearance of impropriety standard for judges? Critics
have claimed that the standard risks discipline on "the whim of judicial
disciplinary authorities," 5 8 "chill[s] courageous and innovative judicial
decision-making," 59 and makes it difficult for judges to predict how the
60
standard will apply.
In my view, the first two concerns are easily overcome. Although the
standard for judges has been in place for decades, 6 1 I am unaware of a
single instance in which a judge has been disciplined for creating an
appearance of impropriety in rendering a judicial decision. 62 I am also
unaware of any evidence that judges have been subject to discipline on
the whim of judicial disciplinary counsel. 63 And, as a side note, it is the
55. See In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Against N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 395 (Minn.
1985) (quoting In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 809 n.7 (Minn. 1978)) (rejecting vagueness
challenge to rules prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and conduct that
adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law).
56. See, e.g., In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d at 564 ("[A] greater degree of flexibility is permitted with
respect to judicial discipline than is allowed in criminal statutes.").
57. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985) (referring to rule prohibiting "conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar"); Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.
1988) (denying void for vagueness challenge to rule prohibiting conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice).
58. APRL Letter, supra note 17, at 6.
59. Id. at7.
60. See, e.g., id. at 9; Abramson, supra note 3, at 955; Rotunda, supra note 3, at 1342-44.
Professor Rotunda also criticizes the vagueness and unpredictability of the appearance of
impropriety standard on the ground that it "arm[s] any lawyer or any pundit with the equivalent of
a blunderbuss to attack a judge." Rotunda, supra note 3, at 1341.
61. For a brief history of the appearance of impropriety standard for judges, see Abramson,
supra note 3, at 952-53.
62. See Gray, supra note 49, at 92 (describing how cases in which judges are disciplined
based on a legal opinion do not rely on the prohibition against the appearance of impropriety but
rather are based on other provisions such as those requiring the judge "respect and comply with
the law").
63. See id. at 65 (explaining that case law analysis demonstrates that "judicial discipline
authorities are not using the standard as an arbitrary smell test but are applying it in a cautious,
reasoned, and appropriate manner with no evidence of overly subjective interpretation"). The
APRL Letter that raised the "risk" of disciplinary action on the "whim of judicial disciplinary
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courts themselves, of course, and not the judicial disciplinary counsel,
that have the ultimate authority to decide whether a judge will be
disciplined for creating the appearance of impropriety. 64
More
importantly, although reasonable minds may disagree whether any
particular conduct creates the appearance of impropriety, the decisions I
have read in this area are based on conduct that was, at best, highly
questionable. If the critics are correct, then they should be able point to
existing cases in which judges have been disciplined or even charged
with conduct that no reasonable person would predict could involve the
impermissible appearance of impropriety.
Spector v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct6 5 and Huffinan v.
Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission66 are two
decisions that have been cited by critics as examples of the unfairness of
the appearance of impropriety standard. 6 7 To the contrary, I believe that
these two decisions illustrate precisely why the appearance of
impropriety standard is a necessary component of a judicial discipline
code for the twenty-first century.
In Spector, a judge had made appointments of certain lawyers as
guardians ad litem, receivers, and referees at a time when he knew that
the lawyers' fathers were judges who were simultaneously making
appointments of the judge's own son for similar positions. 68 The
majority and the dissent agreed that the judges could not have appointed
their own sons to these appointments, because such acts would be in
violation of anti-nepotism rules; they also agreed that it would have
been improper to have expressly arranged to make cross-appointments,
as a form of disguised nepotism. 69 There was no evidence that the
authorities" cited no examples of arbitrary charging decisions. See APRL Letter, supra note 17
and accompanying text. And, with respect to the "experiences of APRL members throughout the
country," the Letter notes only that "[m]embers report that disciplinary prosecutors and
investigators, in order to put additional pressure on judge respondents, often tack on [appearance
of impropriety] charges in addition to their more specific claims," thereby causing the judge
respondents to settle. APRL Letter, supra note 17, at 10. The Letter does not claim that the AOI
charges were arbitrary or that they were made on the mere "whim" of the disciplinary
prosecutors.
64. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 8 (3d. ed. 2000) (noting
that decisions of judicial conduct commissions are ordinarily "appealable to a court, which has
the final say as to what constitutes judicial misconduct").
65. Spector v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 392 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1979).
66. Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 42 S.W.3d 386 (Ark. 2001).
67. See APRL Letter, supra note 17, at 10 (quoting Justice Fuchsberg's "scathing dissent" in
Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 556 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting)); Rotunda, supra note 3 at 1363-65
(criticizing decision in Huffman).
68. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 552-53.
69. According to the majority, "[N]epotism is to be condemned, and disguised nepotism
imports an additional component of evil because, implicitly conceding that evident nepotism
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cross-appointments were in fact made to circumvent the nepotism rules.
Nevertheless, the judge was disciplined for creating the appearance of
disguised nepotism.70 In a vigorous dissent, cited by critics of the
appearance of impropriety standard,7 ' Judge Fuchsberg lambasted the
majority for disciplining a distinguished judge on the mere appearance
of impropriety.7 2 After all, he complained, there was no rule that
prohibited the appointment of relatives of other sitting judges, no rule
that automatically disqualified such individuals from consideration for
appointments, and no rule advising that such selections would give rise
to an appearance of impropriety.7 3 Of course, the judge in question was
not disciplined merely for appointing the relatives of other sitting
judges, but rather for doing so at a time when he knew that his own son
was being appointed by these very same judges for similar positions.
This created the appearance that the appointments were being
coordinated.7 4
In Huffinan, also cited by critics as inappropriately relying on the
appearance of impropriety standard, the judge and his wife owned
12,000 shares of Wal-Mart stock worth about $700,000.76 Judge
Huffman argued that his family's economic interest in Wal-Mart was de
minimis in relation to the total outstanding shares of Wal-Mart stock,
and their interest could not have been substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding. 77 As a result, Judge Huffman agreed to
hear Wal-Mart's request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), even
though he had recused himself in prior proceedings because of his stock
ownership.7 8 Judge Huffman argued that because his stock ownership

would be unacceptable, the actor seeks to conceal what he is really accomplishing." Id. at 553.
In his dissent, Justice Fuchsberg emphasized that "there [was] no contention that one
[appointment] was a quid pro quo for the other." Id. at 557 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 553 ("[E]ven if it cannot be said that there is proof of the fact of disguised
nepotism, an appearance of such impropriety is no less to be condemned than is the impropriety
itself.").
71. See APRL Letter, supra note 17, at 10.
72. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 556-57.
73. Id. at 557.
74. Id. at 555 ("In the present case the fact that cross appointments were knowingly made by
petition during the period in question is not disputed. Notwithstanding the absence of proof of
any actual or intended impropriety there was thereby inescapably created a circumstantial
appearance of impropriety.").
75. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
76. Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 42 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Ark.
2001).
77. Id. at 390.
78. Id. at 388-89.
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was de minimis he was not obliged to recuse himself. 7 9 Nevertheless,
he was disciplined both for creating the appearance of partiality (under
the more specific recusal rules) 80 and for creating the more general
81
appearance of impropriety.
Was it unfair to discipline Judge Huffman for creating either the
appearance of partiality or, more generally, the appearance of
impropriety? Here it helps to focus not on the stock ownership rules per
se, but rather on the unique circumstances in which the judge agreed to
rule on the TRO, including the fact that the judge had previously
recused himself in cases involving Wal-Mart, but he failed to do so
here. 82 Having previously recused himself, his failure to do so in this
instance was significant. In addition, the hearing over which he
presided was one where the union was not even represented-it was an
ex parte request for a TRO. 8 3 Under these specific circumstances, the
fact that Wal-Mart received a favorable ruling from a judge who owned
a considerable number of shares of Wal-Mart stock might reasonably
create the appearance that the judge had bent over backwards to
accommodate the company.
Spector and Huffinan suggest three compelling reasons why the
appearance of impropriety test is necessary, and why it is simply not
possible, as the critics have suggested, to look back on thirty years of
experience with the appearance of impropriety standard and simply
codify specific prohibitions against the kind of conduct that has
previously been condemned under that standard.84
First, it would often be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a
judge has engaged in an actual impropriety. For example, if the judge
in Spector was in fact engaged in a deliberate effort to bypass the
nepotism rule, it is unlikely that the disciplinary authorities would have

79. Id. at 390.
80. Id. (citing ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l), which states that "[a] judge
shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned"); see also ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)
(2003) (identical provision).
81. Huffman, 42 S.W.3d at 389.
82. Id. at 388-89.
83.

Id.

84. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 3, at 1362-63, 1376; cf APRL Letter, supra note 17, at II12 (proposing limiting improper appearances to appearance of violating a specific conduct rule,
such as prohibiting "conduct which involves, or appears to involve, repeated or flagrant disregard
of established applicable law").
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been able to detect or prove that fact. 85 As a result, in order to prevent
some actual improprieties, it will be necessary to discipline the judge
for, at the very least, creating the appearance of impropriety. This was
true not only of Spector, but also of the case involving the Louisiana
judge who appeared in blackface paint at a Halloween party held in a
public place. 86 Even if he was actually prejudiced against black
litigants, this would be very difficult to prove. 87 In any event, he
created the clear impression that he was so prejudiced.
Second, there are many ways in which a judge's conduct can create
the appearance of impropriety, and there is no way that specific rules
can capture all these situations. For example, prior to Spector, we might
not have anticipated that judges could use cross-appointments to avoid
application of the nepotism rules or, that if they did so, there would be
virtually no way to prove that the judges were in fact engaged in
disguised nepotism (i.e., a deliberate attempt to bypass the nepotism
rules). Based on Spector, we could now create a rule that prohibits
cross-appointments, regardless of whether or not they are intended to
circumvent the anti-nepotism rule. However, such a specific rule would
not prohibit other undesirable conduct that we simply did not and could
not have anticipated at the time we drafted the rules.
Third, as illustrated in Huffinan, sometimes it is the unique features
of a situation that create the appearance of impropriety. If, in fact, there
was no significant chance that the value of the judge's stock ownership
could be affected by the judge's rulings in the case, then perhaps we
would not want a specific rule that automatically disqualifies a judge
who owns more than a few shares of a company that appears as a
litigant. 88 But the facts in Huffman were more nuanced. Given that the
judge had already recused himself twice in proceedings involving WalMart, 89 and that he was ruling on an ex parte motion of the Wal-Mart
lawyers, 90 his failure to recuse himself was more likely to create the
belief on the part of the union-as well as the public at large-that his
ruling was not impartial.
85. Judges engaged in a deliberate effort to bypass the rule are not likely to reduce their
agreement to writing or tell others about their conduct. Similarly, they are unlikely to candidly
admit their transgression when questioned by disciplinary authorities.
86. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
87. In this case, there was evidence of a lack of disparity in his sentencing based on race. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text. Even if there was such evidence, however, it would not in
itself be clear proof that the disparity was a result of prejudice and not some other cause.
88. But see Rotunda, supra note 3, at 1364-65 (urging adoption of bright-line federal rule
requiring disqualification when judge has any financial interest in a party to a dispute).
89. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, it is these three concerns that arguably lie at the heart of the
more general prohibitions found not only in judicial disciplinary codes
but also in lawyer disciplinary codes: (1) the difficulty of proving
violation of many specific rules, 9 1 (2) the inability to predict in advance
all of the specific conduct that should be prohibited,9 2 and (3) the extent
to which the impropriety (or appearance of impropriety) is a function of
nuanced facts that are impossible to either predict or articulate in the
93
more specific provisions of a disciplinary code.
Given these concerns, it is not surprising that both the Conference of
Chief Judges and most of the individual judges who have spoken on the
subject supported retaining the appearance of impropriety standard in
the 2007 Judicial Code.

91. Discipline for these rules is sometimes the result of a stipulation of the parties. For
example, in People v. Blundell, a lawyer stipulated that in an alleged attempt at "humor" he had
made threatening remarks to the employer of several of the lawyer's clients. People v. Blundell,
901 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Colo. 1995). As a result, he agreed to be disciplined for conduct adversely
reflecting on his fitness to practice law. Id. In fact, he might have intended to physically assault
the employer, which would have constituted criminal conduct for which the lawyer would likely
have received a more severe sanction. Bar counsel might have agreed to the stipulation because
of the difficulty of proving intent to assault.
92. See, e.g., In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Against N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 395
(Minn. 1985):
The United States Supreme Court recognized long ago that "it is difficult, if not
impossible, to enumerate and define, with legal precision, every offense for which an
attorney or counsellor ought to be removed." Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9,
14 (1856). We ourselves have, in the comparable situation of applying a legislative
standard of judicial conduct, similarly recognized that "necessarily broad standards of
professional conduct" are constitutionally permissible. In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785,
809 n.7 (Minn. 1978).
For an example of this difficulty, see, e.g., In re Gole, 715 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1999). In In re Gole,
an attorney was disciplined for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when he
questioned two clients about their sexual experiences and gave details of his own. Id. at 399.
Many states have adopted Model Rule 1.8(j), which prohibits most sexual relationships with
clients, but it would be difficult to articulate all of the circumstances in which lawyers may
behave inappropriately in a sexual manner without actually engaging or attempting a sexual
relationship.
93. See Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 931-32 (2002) (noting that in drafting some of the more general
provisions it proposed, the Ethics 2000 Commission "was less concerned with clarity and notice
to lawyers and more concerned with flexibility, recognizing that the terms of disciplinary rules
are (and should be) increasingly subject to case-by-case interpretation by ethics committees or
courts").

